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    ABSTRACT 
 
A PARTNERSHIP’S CAPACITY for COMMUNITY IMPACT UNDERSTOOD 
THROUGH NEOLIBERAL TECHNOLOGIES OF RISK and RESPONSIBILIZATION: 
A LOOK at WORCESTER MASSACHUSETTS’ SENATOR CHARLES E. SHANNON 
JR. COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE PARTNERSHIP 
 
Katie Byrne 
 
Since 2006, the Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety Initiative has sought to reduce 
youth and gang violence in multiple Massachusetts cities through partnerships of 
community organizations, research institutions and police departments. Worcester, 
Massachusetts was an original recipient of Shannon funding due to its historic and 
increasing problem of youth and gang violence. Using a framework of governmentality, 
one of the ways crime is problematized and controlled is through the use of neoliberal 
technologies of risk and responsibilization, underscoring neoliberalism’s emphasis on 
personal responsibility. When risk is used to govern and assigned to individuals and groups 
of people living in relegated spaces, interventions become structurally blind. The 
framework of governmentality and risk and responsibilization was helpful in 
understanding Shannon’s capacity for a community impact in Worcester that would 
address structural barriers to equality and de-individualize interventions. Interviews and 
documentary analysis were conducted to understand the capacity of Worcester’s Shannon 
partnership.  The findings revealed successes in increasing awareness of youth violence 
and inter-agency communication. However, because the Shannon Partnership in Worcester 
continues to be responsive to neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization, 
espousing a narrow interpretation of the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM), and lacking 
 community participation and voice, the partnership has not, and will not, move beyond 
individual programmatic responses to more structural responses to youth and gang 
violence, further maintaining the status quo. In Worcester, Massachusetts, a post-industrial 
gateway city, the disadvantaged ecological context of many youth’s lives disallows 
progress to be made solely through programmatic services provided by the partnership’s 
strategy. 
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Introduction 
The neoliberal state, where free-market ideology and emphasis on personal 
responsibility are prolific, has created and maintained marginalized spaces where 
individuals and groups are held responsible for desolate conditions (Keene & Padilla, 
2014; Padilla, 2013; Slater, 2015; Wacquant, 2010), and where individuals are being 
responsibilitized by programs prioritizing brutal independence, decontextualizing the 
environment in which they live (Goshe, 2014; Goldson, 2005).  Free-market ideology has 
prioritized enterprising individuals over the social reproduction of labor, further 
marginalizing communities, because opportunities are not available with the same 
frequency across all spaces and neighborhoods (Young, 2014; Vidal, 1995). Urban 
desolation has left many youth without opportunities for social or economic participation, 
creating geographic gaps in opportunities (Wacquant, 2010; Vidal, 1995). Young people 
who grow up in poor families and poor neighborhoods where disadvantage is correlated 
with economic hardship, life distress and social isolation, are more likely to be delinquent 
(Thornberry, Lizzote & Krohn, 2003, p. 35).  
“Governmentality literature offers a powerful framework for analyzing how crime 
is problematized and controlled”  (Garland, 1997).  Governmentality scholarship was 
introduced by Michael Foucault and continued by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller who 
describe governmentality as conducting conduct, with conduct being governed when it has 
appeared problematic and amenable to intervention (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 14). Crime is 
problematized and controlled partly through the use of neoliberal risk and responsibility 
technologies. Remedies for problems like crime and anti-social behavior are ideas like 
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moralization and the promotion of individual responsibility, instead of wider social-
structural factors (Goldson, 2005). When risk is assigned and targeted to individuals and 
groups of people living in relegated spaces, interventions become structurally blind. The 
individual is problematized and contextual factors are ignored.  
The matter of ‘criminality’, especially youth offending, has shifted from a purely 
criminal justice matter to a matter that includes problems of education, health, employment 
and the risks of social exclusion and anti-social behavior (Muncie, 2006). This has caused 
governments to attack these problems through multi-agency partnerships (Muncie, 2006). 
Taking Rose and Miller’s analysis of governmentality’s function of conducting conduct, 
partnerships are tasked with intervening to change the behavior of individuals. Partnerships 
are a form of governmentality as they encompass a “broad repertoire of technologies that 
operate across the entire social field” (Dahlstedt, 2009). The move to limited government 
in the U.S., and other western cultures, has supported this situation.  Blurred lines between 
public and private spheres has the state reliant on actors from multiple sectors to engage in 
collaborations to solve contemporary challenges that the state is unable to address 
(Dahlstedt, 2009). Power is now decentralized and organized in a way that provides these 
“governing entities” of partnerships with the power to “conduct conduct” (Dahlstedt, 
2009).  
Community partnership models have become preferred and essential in western 
culture for the purpose of undertaking aspects of youth justice, delinquency and violence 
like prevention, intervention and suppression (Goddard, 2014). In 2006, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through the Executive Office of Public Safety and 
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Security (EOPSS) provided funding to several communities across the state through an $11 
million dollar grant program called the Senator Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety 
Initiative, or ‘Shannon’ which was “created to support regional and multi-disciplinary 
approaches to combat gang violence through coordinated programs for prevention and 
intervention” (Van Ness, Fallon & Lawrence, 2006). Worcester, Massachusetts was one of 
the original recipients of Shannon funding, due to its historical and increasing problem of 
youth and gang violence. There are now fifteen communities or “regions” that receive 
Shannon funding.  
A Shannon eligible youth is defined by EOPSS as a youth between 10-24, living in 
a high-risk area within the community, and at-risk or high-risk of becoming involved, or 
currently involved, in gang activity (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016).  Shannon 
uses the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM) from the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) that combines intervention, prevention, suppression, 
community mobilization and organizational change components into a violence reduction 
and gang prevention/intervention strategy.  The CGM is considered an evidence based 
practice (National Gang Center, 2010).  
 The issue that inspired examining the Shannon Partnership in Worcester was that 
the partnership is in its ninth year and the structure of programmatic responses to a 
community problem of youth and gang violence is still the central tenant of the 
partnership, and any community impact from this sustained effort is not clear. I define 
community impact as the intentional acknowledgement and removal of structural 
inequalities, like gaps in education and wealth between classes and races, and the de-
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individualization of interventions. Community impact is defined in this way to prevent 
scapegoating individuals for community problems like violence, by examining how 
individuals are at the mercy of larger societal contributions to community problems.  
Through interviews with Shannon stakeholders and documentary analysis from 
nine years of Shannon documents I developed an understanding of the capacity of the 
partnership to make a community impact. Shannon documents emphasized the 
partnership’s focus on individual reporting metrics and risk factors, and interviews with 
stakeholders communicated the attention given to the risk levels of individuals, and the 
limited participation of the wider community.  These factors limit moving interventions 
beyond the individual and widening the narrow interpretation of the CGM. The challenges 
Shannon faces in making a community impact are underscored by neoliberal technologies 
of risk and responsibilization that create structurally blind interventions because the 
individual is assigned blame and scapegoated as the essence of the problem. 
 This paper does not seek to provide recommendations, because I believe that 
neoliberalism and its effects are as much of a philosophical exploration of the socio-
political, as are a state of our humanity. Any recommendations would be too dramatic to be 
considered realistic.  However, this paper does explore what is possible in the neoliberal 
state for the community to start moving toward thinking about structural and systemic 
change.  This can provide a platform for which recommendations are developed. This 
paper does develop means of describing the structure and mechanisms of control of a 
system, in order to understand how a strategy aimed at reducing a problem rooted in that 
system is achieved. “Unless, however, one can develop some means of adequately 
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describing the structure of a system, one can hardly turn to what is perhaps a more 
fascinating problem of describing structural change within that system” (Laumann and 
Pappi, 1976, p. 5). 
An Ideological Shift and its Impact on Governing  
Universal Welfare to Neoliberalism 
During the 1930’s and 1940’s, during the FDR era of United States politics, the 
concept of welfare offered universal economic security and “protection from the worst 
consequences of life’s ordinary hazards”, and was based on a certain idea of citizenship 
(Katz M., 2001, p. 4; Rose, 1999 p. 253). The state tried to grant universal economic 
security by ensuring high levels of employment, social security, health, and economic 
progress through the use of the tax system, investments, state planning and intervention in 
the economy, and an extended bureaucratic system for social administration (Miller et al., 
2008, p. 71-72). However, by the 1960s, the notion of welfare changed; the ‘War on 
Poverty’ which started in the mid- 1960s “created an underclass, stripped of self-reliance 
and self-respect, equipped with a client based mentality, degraded and dependent” (Rose, 
1999 p. 256; Katz M., 2001, p. 4). This was partially a result of the “selectivity of 
welfarism” that was prioritized over “collectivism of welfare”, meaning benefits were 
targeted upon the least well-off (Rose, 1999, p. 256).  The ‘War on Poverty’ was widely 
supported because of the idea that it would restore the economic and social character of 
central cities (Vidal, 1995). 
Neoliberalism broke with welfare by reviving liberal skepticisms of government 
overreach, efficiency and bureaucracy (Miller et al., 2008, p. 79). The shift from collective 
welfare acceptance to neoliberalism reframed the narrative around welfare; the United 
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States’ narrative was to get people off, to give people a ‘hand up’ not a ‘hand out’, and to 
link welfare to work or preparation for work, with the mission of creating an ‘active 
citizen’, as welfare dependency implied a person with a lost a sense of responsibility as a 
citizen (Clarke, 2005; Young, 2002; Garland, 1997).  In 1996, President Bill Clinton 
signed a welfare reform bill known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act to “end welfare as we know it” which effectively signaled a war on dependence, 
echoing the critics of welfare who pronounced it as promoting a dependency culture and a 
disincentivized will to work (Katz, M., 2001 pg. 5; Young, 2002).   
Social organization is regulated through neoliberal principles of the market, no 
longer including state based social provisions (Garland, 1997). The ethos of neoliberalism 
emphasizes choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion 
and self-government (Rose, 1999 p. 249), designed to maximize entrepreneurial activity 
(Garland, 1997). Economic entrepreneurship replaced regulation, and in doing so 
encouraged individuals to optimize the quality of life for themselves and for their families 
(Miller et al., 2008, p. 79).  However, this segregates and vilifies those who are welfare 
recipients, void of opportunities for neoliberal optimization. The marginalized underclass, 
this model of welfare creates, cannot represent or organize themselves, they have to be 
represented, while they are simultaneously unified spatially in ‘marginalized’ areas (Rose, 
1999, p. 259).  Neoliberal discourse moved the blame for the degradation of spaces where 
segregated groups of people live onto those individuals and groups (Padilla, 2013; 
Wacquant, 2010).  
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The shift from welfarism to neoliberalism is best understood from the 
reorganization of political rationalities that is in line with contemporary technologies of 
government (Miller et al., 2008, p. 80).  Active agents or citizens are not necessarily an 
invention of recent political regimes, but instead active citizenship, in an active society, 
can be understood as the most fundamental and generalizable set of characteristics in the 
neoliberal rationality of government (Miller et al., 2008, p. 41).  
Free Market Ideology  
Welfare was once described as “the subordination of market price to social justice” 
by sociologist T.H. Marshall (Katz, M., 2001, p. 4). However, social policy is now 
subordinate to economic policy, and the market price has superseded social justice (Gray, 
2009; Jessop, 2002 p. 9;  Katz, M., 2001, p. 5). The shift from the ‘Fordism’ era signified 
by mass consumption, production and full employment to ‘Post-Fordism’ represented by 
neoliberal values of free-market capitalism, a flexible workforce and production for 
purposes of being competitive in the global market has created economic disadvantage and 
has contributed to vast inequalities of wealth, the development of a socially excluded 
underclass with high rates of structural inequality and social exclusion (Young, 2002). 
These inequalities are concentrated in marginalized communities that are the outcomes of 
historical and structural processes, like the globalization of the labor market (Keene & 
Padilla, 2014).  
“The settings in which children grow up in speak volumes about their value as 
present and future members of particular societies”, observed by the neglected social 
reproduction in underfunded and disadvantaged geographical areas (Katz, C., 2001). The 
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reproduction of work, knowledge, and the skills and maintenance of the forces and means 
of production are the political-economic aspects of social reproduction that maintain and 
reinforce class and other categories of difference (Katz, C., 2001).  Over the last several 
decades enterprising individuals have been prioritized over welfare programs in order to 
secure the social reproduction of labor (Rodriguez, Jones & Wagman, 2015; Gray, 2009; 
Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001). This has been encouraged through the move away from 
a full labor force as a main objective in economic policy making, the bolstering of internal 
trade policies that do not support wage growth, and a prominent neoliberal framework that 
cleaved off collective welfare as a priority, replacing it with free-market economics and 
capitalism (Rodriguez, et al., 2015; Gray, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001). 
Using Risk to Govern 
Circuits of Inclusion and Exclusion  
With markets having replaced planning as regulators of the economy, the role of 
the state to provide for the populace is superseded by the expectation that individuals are to 
exercise personal responsibility in order to govern their own conduct and manage risk, like 
unemployment, ill health, old age (even as a victim) in order to optimize their lives (Miller 
et al., 2008, p. 214-215, 79; Muncie, 2006; O’Malley, 2008; Garland, 1997). If one is not 
seen as being a rational actor, responsible for his or her own risk, or observed as normal, 
hardworking and decent, that individual can easily become part of the underclass as the 
‘demonized other’ (Garland, 1996; Young; 2001), which increases the energy around the 
‘war on dependency’ spreading the concept of ‘othering’ and placing blame on families, 
individuals and communities who rely on assistance from the state.  Contemporary welfare 
reforms have sought to micro-manage the behavior of welfare recipients in order to re-
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moralize them (Rose, 1999 p. 263).  The re-moralization of welfare recipients is illustrated 
in the former Mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani’s, declaration that welfare 
recipients ought to scrub graffiti and clean streets to receive benefits (Rose, 1999, p. 263-
264).  
‘Circuits of inclusion’, theoretical and physical spaces of self-reliance, bring in 
“prudent”, “enterprising” individuals who have assumed the responsibility to manage their 
own risk, by taking it upon themselves to secure property, self and family (Rose, 1999 p. 
247; Garland, 1997).  Social inclusion also indicates being part of the ‘flows’, with the 
freedom to transverse space and experience a high degree of mobility (Warr, 2015) as well 
as being targeted for the social reproduction of labor (Katz, C., 2001). Peter Miller and 
Nikolas Rose describe the affiliated as those who have the financial, educational, and 
moral means to ‘pass’ in their role as active citizens in responsible communities (2008, p. 
98).  ‘Circuits of exclusion’, abstract and visible zones of the dependent, capture and 
regulate ‘risky’ individuals or those who are ‘unwilling or unable’ to manage their own 
risk (Rose, 2000), often in spaces that have been marginalized, seen as a threat to public 
contentment and political order (Miller et al., 2008, p. 98) and are susceptible to sparse 
flows, disconnected to outside the neighborhood and not targeted for the social 
reproduction of labor (Warr, 2015; Katz, C., 2001).  Having limited access to broader 
networks forces a reliance on the immediate neighborhood, local environments, and 
networks of family and friends to satisfy needs (Warr, 2015). This becomes problematic 
when those spaces and networks are beset with disinvestment, poverty and violence.  
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Social exclusion is multi-dimensional, including economic, political and spatial 
exclusion, meaning lack of access to information, medical provisions, housing, policing 
and security (Young, 2002).  This limits individuals’ capacities to develop spatial diversity 
and diverse socio-economic networks, reinforcing feelings of marginalization (Warr, 
2015). The circuit of exclusion is where a disproportionate number of young offenders 
originate (Gray, 2009; Young, 2002), labeled as “‘criminal’, ‘near criminal’, ‘possibly 
criminal’, ‘subcriminal’, anti-social, disorderly, and potentially problematic” using risk to 
classify the individuals targeted for intervention, that dismisses the universality of welfare 
for all children (Goldson, 2005).  
Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm 
When thinking about governing “risky” youth, there are parallel processes of 
control happening framed by neoliberal technologies of governmentality: the 
individualization of risk and the responsibilization of young offenders (Gray, 2009). Many 
western countries have employed the use of the risk factor prevention paradigm (RFPP) for 
crime prevention, allowing the targeting of individuals in specific geographical locations 
for prevention, intervention and suppression strategies (Goddard, 2014). The risk factor 
prevention paradigm (RFPP) became popular in the field of criminology in the 1990s 
(Farrington, 1999), supported by an influential 1970’s Cambridge study on the risk factors 
for crime (Armstrong, 2004; O’Mahony, 2009; Farrington, 1999).  The RFPP’s theory is 
that a reduction in crime will exist through the identification of individual risk factors 
paired with intervention aimed at that risk factor (Armstrong, 2004).  
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One approach to looking at a youth’s criminal career, which examines criminal 
activity over time, is through the positivist paradigm that is focused on predicting criminal 
careers using a list of risk factors, like the RFPP (Corr, 2014; O’Mahony, 2009).  The other 
approach is interactionist, setting itself apart from the previous paradigm in three ways.  
One it considers the social, cultural and political processes that impact individuals’ lives, 
informed by France & Homel’s recommendation that there should be greater emphasis on 
the social pathways, and societal access in and out of crime (2007, p. 23; Corr, 2007). 
Two, it incorporates the perspectives of the research participants, namely the meaning and 
understanding they attach to their lives and experiences (Corr, 2014; France & Homel, 
2007, p. 23).  Lastly, it considers ‘contingencies’ that encompass the situational nature of 
choices made, helping to remove the foci from individual micro-level interventions to 
policy interventions (Corr, 2014).  
There have been many critiques of the positivist paradigm’s reductionist 
methodology, which fails to include any social structural contribution to the construction 
and reproduction of offending behavior (Armstrong, 2004).  Negotiation, power and 
legitimacy are the social processes that the RFPP has neglected to incorporate, but are 
important because, “risk and risk taking can be understood as negotiated processes, yet 
criminological studies of risk have largely ignored the ways in which young people 
negotiate and interact with their social worlds” (Armstrong, 2004).  Furthermore, youth 
living in poor areas often feel powerless over prospects for a successful future 
(Arcidiacono, Procentese & Di Napoli,2007).  
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Another critique of the RFPP is that it serves as an obstacle to determining a true 
understanding of youth crime, with most of the identified risk factors serving as vague 
proxies for criminality (O’Mahony, 2009). “The concept of offending is so value laden and 
indeed ambiguous and the actions of offenders are so tied to personal and social contexts, 
emotional experiences and accidents of history that there can be no such limited, 
generalizable set of causal mechanisms” (O’Mahony, 2009).  By using popular styles of 
risk assessments, young offenders needs are equated to personal deficiencies, (Kemshall, 
2008) while histories of multiple disadvantages and social and structural factors, like 
poverty are dismissed and become inferior targets of intervention (Muncie, 2006, 
Kemshall, 2008; Goldson, 2002).   
When risk level is assigned to entire families and communities, it is read as a 
precursor to criminality associated with willful irresponsibility, incorrigibility and family 
and/or individual failure (Muncie, 2006). It is suggested by critics of the RFPP that more 
emphasis needs to be placed on the resources young people have to enable them to make 
the ‘right choices’ about risk (Kemshall, 2008). However, the approach taken to assist 
youth in making the right choices about risk can dematerialize and decontextualize the 
situations in which young people live (Goldson, 2002, p. 392), if a responsibilitizing 
methodology is used, which places emphasis on individual responsibility and ignores 
available resources, opportunities, ecological and biographical contexts. 
‘Structurally Blind’ Interventions 
The concept of responsibilitizing youth can lead to “structurally blind” practices for 
youth justice that prioritize and implement policies focused on individual risk factors, 
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personal responsibility and agency rather than on structural contexts (Goshe, 2014; 
Kemshall, 2008; Goldson, 2005). This can be summed up by what Elliot Currie (1985) 
calls the “fallacy of autonomy” which presumes that the larger social context is separated 
from what goes on inside the family (Goddard, 2012). Problems like unemployment and 
homelessness are looked at as problems within the individual (Rose, 1999, p. 254), not 
society.  
In youth justice there is more emphasis on creating responsible agents than on 
transforming structural barriers (Gray, 2009).  Sonya Goshe argues 
…there is less pressure to change the collective lot of youth when the job is 
considered to be primarily a familial or parental responsibility and the cultural 
mindset prioritizing brutal independence works to strip government bodies of the 
duty to invest in supportive policies while leaving communities, families and 
parents on the hook with scarce resources to dedicate to the task (2014).  
When investment in supportive policies is lacking and brutal independence is emphasized, 
systemic poverty, violence and dependency are allowed to persist because opportunities are 
not available in disinvested spaces where many youth live.  This could lead to punitive 
punishment of youth living in these areas, however, Kevin Haines states, “it is not socially 
or morally acceptable to simply punish a young person without placing them and their 
actions in social context” (2000).  
Structural context is consequently important to consider when creating policy. 
Offending behaviors are located within powerful, structural determining contexts (Scraton 
& Haydon, 2002, p. 325-326), like areas of economic disinvestment. Structural barriers do 
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not necessarily limit a young person’s agency, a universal human attribute (Garland, 1997) 
to make choices, but it does his or her freedom, the capacity to chose without restraint, to 
make a ‘responsible’ choice as it is clouded by external structural constraints in disinvested 
areas (Clarke, 2005; Mizen, 2006; Gray, 2009; Garland, 1997).  
Structural Barriers to Equality in Massachusetts 
“Massachusetts, one of the wealthiest states in the nation has the ability to build an 
economy in which everyone can participate fully” (Rodriquez et al., 2015).  However, the 
overarching neoliberal, Post-Fordist framework prioritizes the enterprising individual over 
a full workforce (Rodriguez et al., 2015; Gray, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001). 
The Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center released a report that highlighted structural 
incongruities between class and race and spotlighted how the black community and 
communities of color are faring in terms of equality in education, economic opportunity 
and health (Rodriquez et al., 2015). This report provides clear evidence that essential social 
necessities are not available to everyone with the same frequency.  
 Poverty 
The Children’s Defense Fund sets the poverty rate for children at 20% (Goshe, 
2014).  In Massachusetts, 31% of black kids and 38% of Hispanic kids live in poverty with 
close to 25% of black kids and nearly 30% of Hispanic kids living in communities with 
concentrated poverty. Impoverished areas result in higher crime rates, underperforming 
schools and poor housing conditions with limited access to jobs (Rodriquez, et al., 2015; 
Deuchar, 2009).  These areas are under-resourced, threatening long term living conditions 
of poverty (Rodriquez, et al., 2015; Deuchar, 2009). Those who live in poverty are likely 
to be there because of factors that limit their inclusion into the economic system, like 
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educational success (Garbarino, 2014).  However, disparities exist when defining poverty, 
as Rose illustrates by stating, “Poverty and many other social ills are cast not in economic 
terms but as fundamentally subjective conditions” (1999), creating ideological contentions 
of the cause and solution of the problem.  
Education 
Various studies show the economic payoff of investment in early childhood 
education, but Massachusetts has cut funding to early childhood education by 20% over 
the last 15 years, with only 36% of three and four year olds receiving public support from 
Head Start or a Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (MDEEC) subsidy 
(Rodriquez et al., 2015). Worcester, a gateway city with a large percentage of families of 
color is beset with fewer resources and lower incomes with roughly one third of three and 
four year olds receiving no support at all for early education (Rodriquez et al., 2015).   
Real Estate Policies 
A higher concentration of low-income kids of color exist in a small number of high 
poverty districts, with a presumed connection between this and historical real-estate 
policies, like redlining neighborhoods or refusal to provide mortgages to families of color, 
spurred by the creation of the Federal Housing Administration in 1934, which prevented 
families of color from obtaining wealth by owning property or moving to suburbs or more 
affluent parts of cities (Rodriquez et al., 2015, Katz, 2001 p. 49). In the 1930’s the first 
public housing regulations sought to preserve the “neighborhood composition guidelines”, 
or, “the racial status quo” (Katz, 2001 p. 49). Accumulation of wealth is vastly different 
among white and black households of the same income levels.  On average, a black 
household will hold only 15 percent of a white household’s wealth even at the same 
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income level (Rodriquez et al., 2015).  This could be a result of policies in the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s by the mortgage companies to charge higher interest rates to families of 
color even if they had the same income as a white household who qualified for market rate 
loans (Rodriquez et al., 2015).  
Since the mid 1970’s the Congressional representation of suburbs has been greater 
than that of cities (Katz, 2001, p. 6). Dramatic inequalities in services stem from the 
disparity between the tax bases of suburbs and cities (Katz, 2001, p. 6).  Furthermore, 
during the Reagan and Bush years, cities saw a halt to federal funds, facilitating the 
stagnation of economic and physical development, putting further strain on the urban poor 
(Katz, 2001, p. 122-123).    
Roots of Violence and Gang Involvement 
In the post-industrial society, crime is filling a cultural, economic and social void (Pitts, 
2001, p. 145). Crime satisfies the important functions of income, power, control and status, 
making it harder to control (Pitts, 2001, p. 146).  
[Crime] embodies the translation of poverty, homelessness, and frustration into 
rage; it records the acting out of blocked aspirations in robbery; it traces the 
consequences of low wages and joblessness in drug dealing. It follows heightened 
poverty and inequality as they arc back toward the affluent in the form of street 
mugging, burgled homes, and smashed windshields. It maps the consequences of 
urban redevelopment that have turned city centers into places of danger by leaving 
them devoid of activity after dark (Katz, M., 2001 p. 54-55).  
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Violence can either be seen as a ‘thing’ that stands alone with an objective meaning of 
harm, pain or death, or it can be seen as a ‘moment’ along a continuum of other moments 
linked together and related to other social processes (Springer, 2012). When violence is 
perceived as a ‘thing’ much of the ecological context of violence is lost, and it becomes 
easy to demonize the perpetrators.   
Children being and knowing they are poor, coupled with the realization that they do 
not have what others have, can cause shame and can be an instigator of violence toward the 
self or others (Gabarino, 2014). Anger that stems from the powerlessness felt over lived 
conditions of oppression and lack of opportunity can lead to violence (Arcidiacono et al., 
2007).  Shared experiences of marginalization can create oppositional attitudes toward 
other socioeconomic groups and social institutions (Warr, 2015). The street gang is an 
outcome of marginalization, and of “multiple marginalities” (Diego Vigil, 2010, p. 158). 
When kids feel a sense of social exclusion through marginalization and stigmatism, other 
forms of social capital could be sought in the form of a gang (Deuchar, 2009). In the 
neoliberal state, that emphasizes personal responsibility, an effort to remedy the underlying 
cause of the “threat” to social and economic life is nonexistent (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014).  
Corr’s research on youths’ opportunity for leisure suggests that youths’ choices are 
bound by lack of access to legitimate funds at the personal level and lack of suitable 
amenities at the community level (2014). However, it is important to note that poverty and 
disadvantage do not in and of themselves lead to criminality, but more so what the 
variables are linked to: psychological processes of discredited identities, injustice and 
inequality (O’Mahony, 2009).  
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Youth and Gang Violence in Worcester 
A Snapshot of Worcester 
Worcester is a city of over 183,000 people (Census, 2014). The median household 
income from 2009-2013 was just over $45,932 compared to the state rate of $66,866 
(Census, 2014). The homeownership rate is 44.4%, compared with the state rate of 62.7% 
(Census, 2014).  Approximately 21.4% of people live below the poverty level, compared to 
11.4% statewide (Census, 2014). There are over 11,000 businesses in Worcester, of those 
7% are owned by black business owners, and 6.5% are owned by Hispanic business 
owners (Census, 2014).  Hispanics make up over 20% of the population, and Black or 
African Americans make up over 11% (Census, 2014).  
The first indicator of a gang problem in Worcester’s Post-industrial era occurred 
during the early 1990’s when the police witnessed a surge of unrelated violent crimes that 
could not be pieced together.  In 1992, the Main South area of Worcester was seeing 
destructive behavior being perpetrated by two “groups” of youth.  A series of high profile 
shootings in the early 90’s indicated a solidification of the gang structures that were once 
acknowledged as “loosely knit” and lacking organization (Wiley, 1992a).  Around this 
same time, the city and police witnessed signs of potential gangs, like colors, clothing and 
graffiti (Wiley, 1992a). However, some residents and students in the city schools, denied 
the existence of gangs, and explained the groups as “just kids who hang around together” 
(Wiley, 1992a).  On the contrary, the Mayor of Worcester firmly believed that if young 
people called themselves a gang, they were a gang (Wiley, 1992a).  It was in 1992 that the 
police developed a formal definition of a gang, but concern was voiced from the public 
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about using the “gang” label so readily, as they believed a group of kids called a gang 
would seek to live down that reputation (Wiley, 1992b; Monahan, 1992).  
In 1993, the violence and gang activity that was “brewing”, surfaced in a more 
violent way. In November of 1993 a high number of shootings and two murders occurred 
(Wiley, 1993). Also in 1994, the number of assaults with a dangerous weapon in the city of 
Worcester was growing faster than the national average, surpassing any other city in 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island or Connecticut (Whearley, 1994). The Worcester Gang Task 
Force formed in 1994, beginning the strategic cataloging of gang members and deliberate 
surveillance of gang activity (Wiley, 1995).  In 1995, it was reported that the city had 20 
gangs, with over 200 members (Wiley, 1995; Wiley, 1995).  Murders continued to rise in 
the subsequent years. Nine murders were reported in 1998 (the average age of the suspects 
was 20) and 14 reported in 2007 (Croteau &Whearley, 2007).  
In 2010, Worcester saw an uptick in the number of shooting incidents in the city; 
the year was cited as one of the most violent in in the city’s history prompting the 
Worcester Police Department to implement an additional patrol unit (Croteau, 2010). In 
2011, the homicide rate reached an all time high (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015).  The 
Worcester Police Gang Unit believed the violence to be driven by gangs and gang involved 
youth, the majority being youth of color (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015). The pattern 
of increased shooting violence continued into 2013 with a 50% rise in nonfatal shootings 
compared to 2012 (Croteau, 2014).  Knife violence in the same year increased at a rate of 
22% compared to 2012 (Croteau, 2014). 
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This rise in crime was cited as an effect of the gang activity (Croteau, 2014). 
Currently there are around 1,000 “certified” gang members on the Worcester Police 
Department’s Gang Unit list, however the Gang Unit has identified only a select number of 
high impact players (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015).  Only about three city gangs are 
driving most of the violence, and gang membership has grown in those three gangs 
(Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015).  In 2015, prosecutors in a case typified the violence as 
a “gang war” between Main South and East Side gangs (Allen, 2015).  An Assistant 
District Attorney in Worcester commented on the serious series of shootings that have 
occurred in 2015 saying, "These are very dangerous times and very serious incidents we're 
dealing with” (Allen, 2015). 
Purpose of Partnerships in Youth Justice 
Welfare bureaucracies have been replaced by new logics of competition, market 
segmentation and service agencies with community entities linked up in circuits of 
surveillance and communication designed to minimize the riskiness of the most risky 
(Rose, 1999, p. 259-260). The matter of ‘criminality’, especially youth offending, has 
shifted from a purely criminal justice matter to a matter that includes problems of 
education, health, employment and the risks of social exclusion and anti-social behavior 
(Muncie, 2006). This has caused governments to attack these problems through multi-
agency partnerships (Muncie, 2006). Governing through partnerships has become more 
and more common in areas like crime policy, with community partnership models 
becoming preferred and essential in western culture for the purpose of undertaking aspects 
of youth justice, delinquency and violence like prevention, intervention and suppression 
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strategies (Dahlstedt, 2009; Goddard, 2014).  Western culture is distinguished because of 
the decentralization of governments.  
According to Michael Foucault, who termed the concept of governmentality, 
governance comprises a “broad repertoire of technologies that operate across the entire 
social field” (Dahlstedt, 2009). Taking Rose and Miller’s notion of conducting conduct, 
partnerships are undertaking this function of governmentality and using practice guides, 
transferable models, and evaluations help to constitute governmental spaces and subjects 
(Larner et al., 2005), subject to risk prediction models (Goddard, 2012). Partnerships are a 
mix of specialist institutions that provide meaningful services, while also delineating 
youth’s space and organizing their time (Goldson, 1997, p. 22), in an effort to 
responsibilitize and manage risk. In this space emerges a set of managed socializing 
activity (Goldson, 1997, p. 22), a form of governmentality.  
The move to limited governments in the U.S. and other western cultures has 
supported this situation, as the central government is not in control of day-to-day 
operations of the partnership (Goddard, 2012). Furthermore, the blurred lines between 
public and private spheres has the state relying on actors from multiple sectors to engage in 
collaborations to solve contemporary challenges that the state is unable to address 
(Dahlstedt, 2009). The decentralization and reorganization of power has happened in such 
a way that provides the “governing entities” of partnerships with power (Dahlstedt, 2009), 
like that of “conducting conduct”. The pressure of thwarting crime and enacting change is 
now less of an objective of government action and more of an objective placed on 
organizations, institutions and individuals of society, or the ‘everyday life world’ (Garland, 
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1996). This is ‘governance-at-a-distance’ that leaves the state more powerful than before 
because of its influence on organizations outside of the state, and the dissolution of the 
state as the primary protector and the public’s representative (Garland, 1996).  
The fundamental idea of partnerships is that they are “built on overlapping interests 
that converge on the aim of improving community conditions” (Baum, 2000).  A 
partnership is formed under the premise that by acting together more can be accomplished 
than through acting alone (Baum, 2000; Caplan & Jones, 2002; Green, 2001). However, 
with the power to “conduct conduct” can come fantasies about what can realistically be 
accomplished; it is often the case that the problems are bigger than the capacity of the 
collective capacity (Baum, 2000). “Advocates may exaggerate partnerships’ potential, 
minimize their requirements, and ignore evidence that development is often disjointed and 
tenuous” (Baum, 2000). They may imagine that “simply creating a partnership magically 
produces resources that will solve problems without realistically analyzing the problems, 
strategizing to address them and organizing necessary resources” (Baum, 2000).  
When a partnership assumes it is able to solve youth violence without addressing 
structural inequalities, due to lack of wider community participation, resources, capacity, 
or will, individual risk factors become the target of intervention. Strategies for intervention 
are developed around personal responsibility to solve youth violence, in turn minimizing 
the importance of addressing issues like poverty.  The problem is considered addressed and 
taken care of through a very narrow approach.  
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Engaging the Community Voice in Partnerships 
With a partnership’s goal of improving community conditions, it is able to 
incorporate more of a focus on “bottom-up” development rather than “top down”, because 
of the inclusion of grassroots organizations and community voice in the development of 
partnership strategy (Larner & Butler, 2005).  Furthermore, the Office of the Surgeon 
General (2001) stated that public health science revealed youth violence prevention 
programs were most effective if they were science based, comprehensive and included 
coaction by schools, communities and families (Backer & Russ, 2007).  The emphasis in 
this section is on the inclusion of communities, families and I go as far as to say even the 
individuals affected by the interventions.  
Community based participatory research (CBPR) is revered for its inclusion of the 
community in decision making processes (Bidwell, 2009).  Through an emancipatory 
process of research and action the community is empowered to control the decision-
making and are given legitimate voice (Bidwell, 2009). CBPR, or community engaged 
research (CER), similar to CBPR could be a part of a community mobilization effort in 
youth violence prevention.  CER is defined as “a collaborative approach to research that 
democratically involves community participants and researchers in one of more phases of 
the research process” (Nation, Bess, Voight, Perkins & Juarez, 2011). The method of CER 
relies on the understanding of the target of research and the integration of the learned 
knowledge into the action to improve the community (Nation, et al., 2011). Participatory 
research approaches aim to democratize the creation of knowledge, legitimizing the world 
view of the powerless (Stoecker & Bonacich, 1992). Furthermore, the aim is for 
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knowledge to lead to empowerment (Stoecker, et al., 1992). Knowledge should not rest 
only in the minds of the professionals used to study objects, but the knowledge, and 
theories of oppression, should be created and used by oppressed and powerless 
communities as well (Stoecker, et al., 1992).  
There is concern voiced in the research as to how much research is applied to a 
community but developed through a relationship between the grant agency and researchers 
rather than between the researchers and the community (Green et al., 2001).  Partnerships 
with the greatest potential for action include overlapping understanding of the public’s 
perceived needs and actual needs as well as the resources to carry out the action (Green et. 
al, 2001). Partnerships have the power to increase understanding of the public’s actual 
needs (Green et al., 2001), however, this most likely requires participatory research or 
organizational development and community mobilization.  
Critical to this approach is the following consideration: “communities are 
somewhat unaware of how power and structural forces influence their lives, and this 
awareness must first be addressed via empirical evidence in order to provide a foundation 
for subsequent critical action” (Nation, et al., 2011). Integrating this type of community 
based approach into violence prevention efforts would require acknowledgement and 
agreement about the root of the problem, and the encouragement of dissent and 
acknowledgement of power differentials between groups (Nation, et al., 2011).   
The ideal model of CBPR can often fall short of what is possible in reality due to 
factors like bureaucracy of government agencies or lack of interest, or irreconcilable power 
differentials (Stoecker, et al., 1992; Nation, et al., 2011). Even with CBPR principles in 
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place, a political framework that no longer guarantees public welfare exists. However, 
CBPR can be, and should be used to push on the status quo of development and 
community intervention, and the ideals of this model should be what partnerships striving 
for community impact should evaluate themselves against (Stoecker, et al., 1992).  
Using a Framework for Service: The Comprehensive Gang Model 
Gang prevention programs that utilize the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM) 
embody the theory that gang violence is an outcome of social disorganization, where key 
organizations are not collaborating, and where there are insufficient resources to target 
youth (National Gang Center, 2010). This theory calls for organizations to work together in 
a coordinated manner that is team focused, integrated and inclusive of law enforcement, 
social welfare organizations and grassroots organizations (National Gang Center, 2010). 
Shannon grantees are expected to utilize the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention’s (OJJDP) CGM that EOPSS endorses.  This model incorporates five areas: 
Suppression, Social Intervention, Opportunities Provision, Organizational Change and 
Community Mobilization. The CGM can be described as a “script” (Garland, 2012) given 
to the partners by the state.  
The CGM is also termed the “Spergel Model” because in the late 1980’s OJJDP 
conducted a juvenile gang suppression and intervention research and development program 
led by the late Dr. Irving Spergel, a professor from the University of Chicago (National 
Gang Center, 2010).  The five strategies that eventually became the CGM were 
consolidated from a national assessment of organization, agency and community groups’ 
responses to gang problems in the United States (National Gang Center, 2010).  The 
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findings from this national assessment identified the strategies these groups used for 
violence reduction, which then become the CGM (National Gang Center, 2010).  
The CGM is considered an evidence based practice, and violence reduction is 
thought to occur with investment into each of the five areas. The Little Village Gang 
Reduction Project (GVRP) in Chicago’s gang ridden Little Village utilized the CGM in 
their response to the ongoing youth and gang violence (NIJ, Program Profiles).  The GVRP 
was evaluated using a quasi-experimental design.  Three groups of youth were included in 
the design, youth who were part of the program group, youth who received some services, 
and youth in the comparison group who received no services.  Changes in arrest histories 
for a four and a half period before the program and a four and a half year period program 
period were compared. The GVRP saw reductions in arrests for violent crimes and drug 
crimes, but did not appear to have an effect on property crimes or total arrests (NIJ, 
Program Profiles). The Model Programs Guide from OJJDP rates this program as 
promising, this is the only evaluated program in the Models Program Guide that used the 
CGM as a framework for violence and gang reduction (NIJ, Program Profiles).  
Limits of the CGM in Addressing Structural Barriers 
Although the CGM is seen as promising and is promoted as an evidence based 
strategy, it promotes increased programmatic activity and communication between entities, 
with an acceptance for narrow implementation by users.  Given this, there are limitations 
of this model in addressing structural barriers, like inequality of wealth and systemic 
violence and racism that will inevitably limit its capacity to reduce and prevent youth and 
gang violence.  
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Social Intervention 
 Social intervention practices are usually based within local community-based 
organizations that facilitate programs aimed at socialization and community protection, 
with an emphasis on mainstreaming gang youth (Spergel, 1995, p. 185).  The critique of 
early intervention is that it is associated with risk; if early intervention is delivered based 
on assigned risk levels then the right to belong in ‘circuits of inclusion’ if non-criminality 
is sustained, will be reinforced (Kemshall, 2008). Early intervention programs are only as 
effective to the extent that the larger social system supports them (Garbarino, 2014), and 
resists further marginalizing people and places by removing the emphasis on 
responsibilization.    
Opportunities Provision 
             Opportunities provision is the provision of additional social opportunities through 
specific educational, training and employment programs (Spergel, 1995, p. 184). 
Worcester Shannon’s main focus is providing opportunities to youth, mostly in the form of 
job opportunities. However, there is little to suggest that brief employment, not connected 
to any other aspect of a youth’s life, will cause a reduction in delinquent behavior, taking 
into consideration the age of the target population and the environment where the youth 
reside (Alstrohm & Havighurst, 1982; Apel, Paternoster, Bushway & Brame, 2006; 
Bushway & Reuter, 2002; Collura, 2010; Crowley, 1984; Mihalic & Elliot, 1997; 
Paternoster, Bushway, Brame & Apel, 2003; Pilavin & Masters, 1981; Ploeger, 1997; 
Smith & Thompson, 1983; Staff, Osgood, Schulenberg, Bachman, Messersmith, 2010; 
Staff & Uggen, 2003; Sullivan, 1984; Sviridoff & McElroy, 1985; Uggen & Wakefield, 
2008; Votey, 1991; Wald & Martinez, 2003; Wright, Cullen & Williams, 1997). Research 
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conducted by Hazel, Hagell, Liddle, Archer, Grimshaw and King (2002), cited in Gray, 
evaluated the value of detention employment training programs and found that while in 
detention many youth had positive attitudes about employment and were fully 
participating, however when released, less than one fifth of participants were involved in 
work (2009).  This could be a result of youth returning back to the same environments they 
were in before they were sent to detention.  
             Shannon programs focus on the supply side of unemployment with emphasis on 
the individual’s motivation. When assessing individual behavior and focusing on 
responsibilitizing youth through jobs, failure is understood as a lack of motivation rather 
than lack of opportunity from poor economic conditions. Poor economic conditions 
produce low wages, and low quality jobs (Hannah-Moffat, 2005) that stand in the way of 
sustained employment and livable wages. “The concept of transformation has become 
depoliticized and detached from any association with radical structural reform through the 
redistribution of resources and opportunity or through direct government intervention in 
the economy to stimulate demand for youth labor or regulate the types of work being 
created by the free market” (Hannah-Moffat, 2005; Mizen, 2006).  A strategy like this will 
not intervene to invigorate the structural links between poor neighborhoods and labor 
markets (Pitts, 2001, p. 147).  Without the government regulating employers and the labor 
market, young people will continue to participate in low quality work training and low 
wage, low-skilled, short term employment (Mizen, 2006, p. 197).  
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 Suppression 
Suppression through the CGM is defined as formal and informal control procedures 
like surveillance, supervision and monitoring of youth by police and community-based 
agencies (Spergel, 1995, p. 185). Swaths of space are opened to surveillance, a mechanism 
of control disproportionately affecting youth of color because the places youth of color are 
most likely to live are spaces that are governed, socially ordered and managed through a 
RFPP (Goddard, 2012).  Even though crime and high risk victimization have an uneven 
social distribution, they are perceived as facts of modern life (Garland, 1996), increasing 
the threat felt by the public and the justification for potentially punitive punishments and 
surveillance.  There is essentially a punitive bind where police officers are tasked with 
applying punitive sanctions on disorderly individuals but these sanctions do nothing to get 
at the underlying causes of violence (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014).  
Suppression efforts remain insufficient if not in collaboration with other areas of 
the CGM (Spergel, 1995, p. 185). The CGM dictates work happen on both ends of the 
spectrum, prevention and suppression, which begs the question: are youth seen as 
endangered innocents, or dangerous and unworthy (Tilton, 2010), or both, and how does 
the public, and Shannon partnership reconcile this dichotomy?  The dichotomous CGM 
provides no answer or guidance to understanding that question.  
Community Mobilization and Organizational Change 
Community mobilization was first utilized as a way to counter social 
disorganization (Spergel, 1995, p. 172).  In the 1980’s and 1990’s it grew into a strategy to 
develop and involve coalitions of justice agencies with schools, community groups and 
even former gang members with local, state, federal agencies and resources to deal 
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collectively with the problem of gangs (Spergel, 1995, p. 172).  Through Spergel’s 
explanation of community mobilization, police are in key coordination positions to deal 
with problems (1995, p. 172). Not mentioned in the community mobilization strategy is the 
importance of community participation and accountability by community members.  
Organizational change calls for the previous strategies to be organized and 
integrated depending on the scope of the problem and the mission of the organization 
(Spergel, 1995, p. 185). Critical elements of this strategy are agency collaboration, joint 
planning and information sharing (National Gang Center, 2010). Organizational change, as 
it is defined, does not call for putting pressure on larger systems and policies, it does 
however call for the organization policies and practices to be inclusive and community 
oriented (National Gang Center, 2010). The lack of clarity of what organizational change is 
and should be does not easily encourage a discussion and move toward incorporating 
systems change into the CGM.  
Methodology 
The primary research question that the current research was aimed at answering 
was “can a youth and gang violence prevention partnership that employs programmatic 
strategies and neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization have a successful 
community impact?” Documentary analysis and interviews were used to gather 
information to inform this research question.  Themes from the interviews and documents 
were then compiled and given meaning through existing literature on associated topics.  
Primary qualitative research was obtained from both documentary analysis and 
interviews. Shannon documents from 2006-2016 such as yearly reports, grant proposals, 
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The Executive Office of Public Safety and Security’s (EOPSS) Availability of Grant 
Funds, quarterly progress reports, meeting minutes, Local Action Research Partner 
(LARP) publications and newspaper clippings were examined.  These documents 
contained information on the history of Shannon, Shannon goals, communication between 
partners, outcomes of programs, challenges, the scope of Shannon programs, the current 
climate of the city’s youth violence problem illustrated by news clippings, anecdotes and 
data, and the outcomes of Shannon in respect to strengthening partnerships and achieving 
outcomes.  
Qualitative research was also obtained from interviews with eight stakeholders of 
the Shannon partnership. These participants were selected because of their varying 
experience in Shannon and the information they could provide about the value of Shannon 
to the community.  The interviewees were two senior researchers with Clark as part of the 
LARP; a Sergeant in the Worcester Police Department who serves as the Shannon Program 
Coordinator; a Caseworker with the Boys & Girls Club (BGC); the Outreach Coordinator 
with Straight Ahead Ministries (SAM); the Job Coordinator with the Worcester 
Community Action Council (WCAC); the Director of Planning at the WCAC and the 
previous Grants Coordinator for the City of Worcester; and the Director of WCAC’s Jobs 
and Education Center.  
These participants were either recruited at a Shannon Advisory Committee 
meeting, through an email, or both.  All participants signed a consent form agreeing to 
participate.  Participants were either representatives of programs, members of the LARP or 
situated at the decision making level. The interview contained questions about individual 
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and organizational roles of Shannon, Shannon’s role in addressing youth and gang 
violence, the function of the partnership, and organizational culture.    
Findings 
History of Shannon 
Worcester, Massachusetts was one of the original communities to receive Shannon 
funding due to its historical and increasing problem of youth and gang violence.  Shannon 
funding was not the first effort made to address the problem (Phase 1 Case Study, 2006).  
However, the influx of new money from the Shannon program allowed for the expansion 
of existing organizations, the formalization of relationships with community outreach 
organizations, increased staffing of the Worcester Police Department (WPD), greater 
information sharing, and the development of a referral system that helped to define 
organizational roles and responsibilities and lessen potential duplication of services. (Phase 
1 Case Study, 2006).  
Worcester Shannon Model 
Currently, Worcester Shannon has allocated funding into four areas: Suppression, 
Opportunities Provision, Social Intervention and Community Mobilization. The Worcester 
Police Department through tactical response teams, and the Project Night Light program 
handles suppression. Even though Organizational Change is not a funded strategy the 
funding of a sergeant in the police department to manage Shannon provides the 
opportunity for organizational change. The Worcester Youth Center (WYC) and BGC 
through case management and job placement services handle opportunities provision. 
Social intervention is done through police youth recreation programs, the Final Notice 
program, the WPD Summer GANG program, the Police-Clergy-Youth partnership and 
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SAM street outreach. Community mobilization practiced through a Clergy Mentoring 
program. Partners come together through Steering Committee meetings or Advisory 
Committee Meetings that happen as frequently as quarterly to as in frequently as twice a 
year or less.  
Partner Roles  
 The functions the Shannon partner organizations have, academic, programmatic, or 
managerial, provide an understanding of any hierarchy that exists within the partnership 
when it comes to decision making and strategy formulation. It also illuminates the capacity 
of the partnership when determining its current ability to harness grassroots and 
community voice.  
Clark University 
Clark University’s role in Shannon is as the Local Action Research Partner or 
LARP.  The LARP, according to the WPD, was responsible for providing the Worcester 
collaboration with the tools necessary to determine if the programs are reaching the correct 
audiences and achieving the intended results. Two senior researchers have been involved 
in Shannon for nine years.  
Early on, a lot of the work done by the LARP was trying to understand what 
Shannon required and building the proper framework to encompass the requirements. The 
LARP also spent time early on explaining its role, discussing data at meetings, and 
focusing on small projects.  The first program implemented was an employment program.  
The LARP’s role was to develop research around this program, ultimately providing 
recommendations on how the program should be tailored to fit the needs of the kids, 
partially done by assisting with interviews conducted with kids in the programs. Both 
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senior researchers remarked that Shannon was very program focused in the beginning, and 
still operates using a program model for services. The LARP’s role is action research, 
action research is a cyclical process of problematization, data collection and analysis, and 
reflection (Riel, 2010-2016). In this model there is not an expectation of CBPR, instead it 
is more of an insular research model where knowledge is generated and shared within the 
partnership. The improvement of the community is a goal of action research (Riel, 2010-
2016), however knowledge generated and developed by research for research undermines 
the necessity of community empowerment, effectually maintaining the status quo.  
Worcester Police Department  
A Sergeant within the WPD was selected by the city to be the Program Coordinator 
for Shannon within the Police Department.  The Program Coordinator stated that he 
believed the purpose of Shannon was to increase the collaboration of the police with 
community organizations. The emphasis on community policing in the last several decades 
has created an expectation for police to work through networks and partnerships for crime 
prevention (Fleming, 2006 p. 87).  Since 1996, the Program Coordinator has served in the 
Gang Unit, and has been a Sergeant since 2006.  The WPD has control over funding 
allocation to partners.  The Program Coordinator explained that the money decisions are 
made between himself and the Chief and another woman within the police department. He 
does not think his role has evolved much since the beginning; in the beginning it was a lot 
of building, and the work happened with one or two community partners. He stated that the 
city has been tough about bringing new people in and he has had to vouch for a lot of 
people to really build up the partnership and the coalition stating, “It is tough to bridge 
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those partnerships since many organizations don’t necessarily fall within the purview of 
Shannon and it is hard to make the case that they do”.  
Straight Ahead Ministries  
The Director of Outreach at Straight Ahead Ministries (SAM), a faith-based 
organization that has been part of the partnership since 2012, describes his role as 
primarily outreach and he likes to think he has some decision making power in the Steering 
Committee meetings when it comes to the direction and implementation of outreach 
services through Shannon.  The Director of Outreach describes SAM’s perspective of the 
problem from a relational perspective, advocating for the youth, trying to understand the 
whole dynamic and the whole family, the needs of the family, and the specific needs of the 
youth. He believes the role of outreach is to be out in community, seeing what the needs 
are, thinking about socio-economic needs and trying to develop a relationship with the 
youth. He believes that outreach can only impart hope and choices, outreach workers are 
not out there to say this is “good or bad”, but instead to provide other options.  Since he 
sees the gangs and violence as more generational, he believes youth see the violence and 
gang membership as what they aspire to be, and through outreach he able to give another 
option, and to share his personal experiences and upbringing to show them something 
different.   
Boys and Girls Club 
The Case Manager with the Boys and Girls Club described his understanding of 
Shannon is that it is a preventative program targeted for youth at risk of joining gangs.  A 
lot of the work he is doing with Shannon is already a part the Boys and Girls Club’s 
mission.  He describes his work as forming relationships with youth and supporting youth 
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to make the right decisions, noting that some youth are in a place to receive it and some 
youth are not.  
Worcester Community Action Council 
The Worcester Community Action Council (WCAC) was the main programmatic 
partner offering a summer jobs program through their job and education center. WCAC’s, 
jobs coordinator, Director of Planning, and Director of Jobs and Education were 
interviewed.  The job coordinator described that about 10-15% of his work with WCAC is 
Shannon related.  The Director of Planning remarked that the partners all know their roles 
and what they are supposed to be doing, so the role of WCAC has not changed, despite 
changes in funding and program structure over the nine years. The Director of Jobs and 
Education voiced that she is not familiar with much of what the other partners are doing, 
but she is very invested in providing services through WCAC that are in line with the 
mission of Shannon.  
Partnership Capacity in Making a Community Impact 
The rise of partnering to solve community problems, with partnerships being an 
extension of governmentality, as power is decentralized at the state level and reorganized 
in entities like partnerships, raises the question of whether Shannon has the capacity and 
power to make a significant community impact with the strategy employed. Through the 
interviews with Shannon partners several themes emerged regarding both the challenges 
and successes of Shannon in making a community impact.  The challenge that 
neoliberalism poses to moving beyond individual responsibility is illuminated through the 
findings that individuals are the identified targets of intervention.  Because of this there is a 
pressure on and expectation of partners to show outcomes based on individual 
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measurements that decontextualize a youth’s life. Shannon is also faced with having to be 
responsive to the punitive public attitudes of justice that individualize and decontextualize 
behavior. Additionally, a siloed and centralized structure exists within the partnership that 
hinders the partnership from moving beyond coordinating to collaborating.  This structure 
and narrow interpretation of the CGM also limits the capacity of Shannon to bring missing 
community voices into the planning and decision making process, effectually preventing 
alternative interpretations of the problem and potential solutions from being explored. 
These alternatives could work to break the individualized focus of Shannon. Given these 
challenges, some successes have been described as less competition, more comfort in the 
partnership and the individual success stories.  
Barriers & Challenges  
Individuals as Targets of Intervention 
Pragmatic “quick fixes” are usually prioritized over critical research and policy 
proposals that have the potential for transformative change (Muncie, 2006). To really 
challenge the status quo the real target must be systems change, but without systems 
change being the shared “phenomena of interest” in Shannon it becomes impossible to 
challenge the status quo in a significant way (Seidman, 1988).  From the interviews with 
stakeholders and Shannon documents it was clear that the ‘phenomena of interest’ is 
individualized or is an aggregate of the individual (Seidman, 1988). Interviewees agreed 
that the shared phenomenon of interest in Shannon is ‘at-risk’ or ‘high-risk’ youth, 
supported by information in Shannon grant proposals.  The three prongs of the CGM that 
are utilized in Worcester are focused on individual targets that function to “conduct 
conduct” and responsibilitize youth.  
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During the first few years of Shannon the LARP created a logic model that laid out 
the overarching goal of Shannon and shared with the partners.  The overarching goal was 
preventing vulnerable youth from becoming involved in gangs or adopting gang behavior, 
reducing current gun and gang violence, improving quality of life for at-risk youth, 
increasing education, job skills, and job opportunities for re-entry offenders.  The 
assumption was that an interdisciplinary approach of criminal justice, community service, 
educational and job training services and re-entry strategies and life skills activities are 
important to the overall violence prevention/reduction plan (LARP, Year Two Final 
Report, 2009). However, this strategy was not outside of the confines of the CGM’s 
provisions and did not include community mobilization or organizational change activities. 
Youth who fit the aforementioned description of “vulnerable” and “at-risk”, as well as 
some “high risk” and “proven risk” youth are still the targets of intervention. A Shannon 
eligible youth is defined by EOPSS as a youth between 10-24, living in a high-risk area 
within the community, and at-risk or high-risk of becoming involved, or currently 
involved, in gang activity (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016).  
In 2015, the Shannon grant proposal required all programs to implement a risk assessment 
to determine Shannon eligibility and aid in case management. When the target of 
intervention is the individual, the response becomes heavily biased toward programs and 
the use of risk to identify individuals.   
           Research on youth offenders’ leisure careers in Ireland revealed that responses to 
youth offending must move from a focus on the individual to one that incorporates an 
understanding of the broader socio-economic and cultural context because of the finding 
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that the onset of youth offending is nestled in the context of disruption and disadvantage 
(Corr, 2014). One of the senior researchers rhetorically questioned how an opportunity can 
supersede an environment by asking how it is possible for a youth to see a real, genuine 
opportunity given to them as a chance for success if that youth’s biographical narrative is 
marked by family or neighborhood distress with generational histories of violence, and 
exposure to inequality, violence and negative behaviors? SAM’s Director of Outreach 
stated: “[Youth] could have a job and a GED, but are still in shit situation, or the other way 
around.”  It becomes impossible to separate the opportunity from the context and to see the 
opportunity as equally accessible across diverse spaces and between all youth.  
Much research supports the notion that “young people in trouble with the law have 
complex systematic patterns of disadvantage which lie beyond any incitement to find 
work, behave properly or take up the ‘new opportunities’ on offer (Muncie, 2006), or the 
opportunities might simply not be there (Vidal, 1995).  SAM’s Director of Outreach 
expressed that, even though he is appreciative of the unique voices present at the table, the 
biggest barrier he sees in making concerted progress in youth justice is the difficulty some 
people have in suspending their views and natural way of thinking about what success 
looks like, like thinking that a kid is not worth the investment, or that the kid won’t make 
the investment themselves. Essentially, there is a modality of thinking that supports the 
responsibilization notion and ignores structural barriers.   
           When youth fail to be ‘responsibilitized’ they are often excluded in various ways by 
society (Muncie, 2006). This then creates a cyclical pattern of condemnation and abjection.  
The Program Coordinator represented this notion by sharing how some police officers are 
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quick to write off a youth who has failed to change his or her behavior after punishment.  
Some could argue that when individuals are given a sense of autonomy to be enterprising 
and responsible it equates to greater freedom, which echoes police officers’ frustrations as 
to why a youth did not change when given a chance.  However, “it would be wrong to 
mistake this independence for freedom, since autonomy must be exercised responsibly” 
(Clarke, 2005).  Essentially, youth who are most likely to come into contact with the 
justice system are most likely captured in some way by programs or partnership efforts, 
however the opportunities on offer from those programs do not grant them broader 
freedoms to be autonomous and productive given biographical and ecological milieu 
addressed in earlier sections of this paper.   
            In a way, since police have no control or perhaps might be lacking nuanced and 
sensitive knowledge over the youths’ milieu, it is understandable as to why frustration 
would stem from repetitious negative behavior.  Moreover, police do not have specialized 
competence in addressing the underlying causes, like poverty and mental illness, of the 
disorder they are policing (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014). However, these tense relations between 
police and youth do little to increase trust and respect between police and youth and make 
progress toward reducing youth and gang violence.  By extension, it can be argued that the 
partnership as a whole does not have the power to address the underlying causes of the 
disorder they are trying to control, however since it is a form of governmentality it is 
tasked with controlling crime and behavior, and it doing so with a focus on individual 
responsibility in line with neoliberalism and the greater goals of the state.  
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Pressure to Show Outcomes 
SAM’s Director of Outreach and other interviewees expressed how much pressure 
there is to show outcomes.  Most funding cycles require resubmission of applications with 
some sort of outcome measured.  He said, “How am I supposed to show anything after two 
years? Sometimes it takes ten.” Another problem with the pressure to measure outcomes is 
that it only shows a snapshot of what is going on with that youth (Goshe, 2014), 
emphasizing the individual.  SAM’s Director of Outreach said you could give a kid four 
hours a day of services and support, but we have no control of what goes on the other 20.  
If a measurement such as recidivism is used to measure outcomes, those youth who fail to 
recidivate could still be enduring a great deal of suffering in their environments, as they are 
sent back to their unchanged social surroundings and potentially continuing to engage in 
negative behavior whether they are caught or not (Goshe, 2014). Even though it should be 
top social priority, it is out of the current capacity of the partnership to prioritize youth’s 
physical, material and emotional security (Goshe, 2014).  WCAC’s Director of Planning 
expressed how when outcomes are measured it is done through numbers, and numbers 
hardly show a true picture, stating that you cannot interpret anything from a quantitative 
measurement of how many youth completed a job training program, and wishes stories 
could be incorporated to show a fuller picture.  
When pressure for cost-effectiveness of programs is put on agencies, administration 
may get in the habit of ‘stacking the deck’ with kids who are not in need of as much 
(Goshe, 2014).  This was reiterated by a senior researcher who remarked in the first four to 
five years, Shannon partners would come to meetings ready to talk about successes and 
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little conversation about problems, challenges or failures would arise.  There is also 
evidence of this from Worcester’s Shannon population numbers, over half of all youth 
served in Shannon programs are considered to be “at-risk”. During a technical assistance 
meeting coordinated by Northeastern University, a senior researcher remembers a speaker 
asking: “Is your failure rate high enough? If not, you’re not going after the highest risk 
kids.”  Targeting non-gang members or former gang members is a waste of a program’s 
resources and could produce secondary deviance (Decker, Pyrooz, Sweeten, Moule, 2014).   
It is easy to work with low-risk kids.  It makes sense that the pressure to show 
individual outcomes in hopes of relaying positive results to ensure the procurement of 
sustained funding is the tendency of many organizations in this field.  Many of the 
Shannon programs are prevention based, meaning an inherent focus on prevention 
programs, and younger lower risk youth. Taking the efficacy of focusing on individual 
interventions instead of structural interventions out of the question, if the problem is youth 
and gang violence, and most programs are prevention based, is it safe to conclude the right 
population within the target is being reached to achieve a measurable community impact? 
Public Attitudes of Justice 
Youth are economically and legally dependent on their parents until a certain age 
which makes them a good target for help, but even within that structure, there is a 
hesitance to being ‘too soft or coddling’ (Goshe, 2014). Neoliberalism has contributed to 
the rise of ‘law and order politics, with punishment being profoundly respected and seen as 
essential to ensuring personal accountability for ‘choices’ (Tilton, 2010 p. 6, 106; Goshe, 
2014). The examples below highlight public perception, or those who voice opinions on 
 43 
social media, of youth punishment. Not illustrated by the quotes below, but there was a 
definite difference in responses to a program that was perceived as holding kids 
responsible and a program that was perceived as letting kids off the hook, with the latter 
comments hostile and the former more welcoming.  
Comments on the article: “Teen Caught Stealing Money from Inside a Vehicle”1, 
were: 
- “I agree, I'd never leave my wallet in my car but that's not the point. The point 
is the guy's a scumbag and hopefully justice is served. Then again, this is 
Worcester... The suspect, although legally an adult, will probably get treated 
like a little kid and get a slap on the wrist.”  
- “I hope someone goes and robs his parents now that his address is published. 
Payback. Loser.”  
- “Lazy scumbag who won't get a job , but will steal from people who do..Trash.”  
- “Bring back reform schools. Nip it in the bud.” 
o “How about corporal punishment instead?”  
- “I would have smashed his head in with a metal bat to many laws protect theses 
little punks .. mess with a bull you get the horns.. this group of kids gonna get it 
soon..”.   
 A memo was posted on the WPD Facebook page titled, “The Worcester Reentry 
Program”2, which explained the program as a way for high-risk offenders leaving prison to 
                                                 
1 “Teen Caught Stealing Money From Inside a Vehicle”, 
https://www.facebook.com/WorcesterPolice/posts/896919083663195 
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be offered wrap-around services in an effort to prevent them from reoffending.  
Commenters expressed feelings about this being a waste of money.  One commenter wrote, 
“…they should just be kept locked up”.  The “fairness” of this program was addressed by 
this man’s comment, “I've never been arrested can I get employment training and 
participate in educational programs or do I need to be arrested first?” to which others 
followed suit.  
Although this representation of comments is not a true sample of the population, 
the sentiment of favoring punishment is an overwhelming share of what is seen in the 
media, and what Shannon is faced with having to be responsive. The macro-systems are 
defined as the “big social and institutional blueprints of society”, or social cultural forces, 
even as big and abstract as they are, they are imbedded in the consciousness of children, 
parents and policy makers (Garabino, 2014).  The notions of ‘law and order’, ‘fairness’ and 
‘justice’ are embedded into the minds of the populace, though the interpretation of these 
concepts varies.  SAM’s Director of Outreach describes the other end of justice and 
fairness by describing the area of justice Shannon is not touching.  He wishes for ‘justice’ 
and ‘fairness’ that supports positive action.  One example of this he gives is the unequal 
legal representation of all youth, stating:  “I have worked with a lot of kids, because of 
their background they don’t have attorneys and a simple charge, trespassing, turns into 
assault and battery, it is a sad state of affairs, they are losing that battle because the charge 
turns into a sentence, they end up with a plea deal, and there goes their future.”   
                                                                                                                                                    
2 “The Worcester Reentry Program” 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.634918159863290.1073741841.33740223961
4885&type=1 
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Shannon is not only fighting against the preference of punitive punishment, but the 
negative media portrayals of spaces and people, according to WCAC’s Director of 
Planning.  Negative attention to places and people can reinforce territorial and individual 
stigma (Wacquant, 2010), something beyond the capacity of Shannon to address.  
Siloed and Centralized Structure   
It was expressed by almost all of the interviews that organizations are doing what 
they would have done without Shannon, although through funding they are theoretically 
able to do more. A Clark senior researcher stated that there is no organized vision, and that 
Shannon is very centralized, and the pieces of the puzzle do not make a picture. Many 
partners expressed that each organization is just doing a piece. Shannon supports programs 
if they are in the general area of youth development and fit somewhat into any area of the 
CGM. Essentially, there is a lack of an overall theory of change and strategic vision. The 
CGM is the assumed theory of change, however, this is merely a script for strategy that is 
narrowly interpreted.  
Without more regular meetings of the partners it is also hard to strategize, or 
discuss challenges and troubleshoot. WCAC’s Director of Jobs and Education expressed 
how she feels disconnected from Shannon overall, with the Director of Planning adding 
that if partners met more it could help with cross communication. In this sense, the 
partnership is coordinating services and cooperating, but not collaborating, these are 
different characteristics of partnerships (Carlton, Whiting, Bradford, Dyk & Vail; 2009).  
Cooperation is where people work together to achieve a goal, whereas collaboration 
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embodies a high degree of dialogue, creativity, evolution and excitement (Carlton et al., 
2009).  
With partnerships as a response to the decentralization of power at the state level, 
there has been a move from a vertical structure of government, where the state is dictating 
conditions, to a horizontal structure of governance where the state is instead one of the 
partners (Dahlstedt, 2009).  The decision making power rests within the governmental 
agency of the police department, this was understood by all the stakeholders. The Program 
Coordinator shared that the state thinks the advisory committee has much more power than 
it does, decision making continues to be centralized and controlled in one entity, limiting 
collaboration. In Shannon the police department has assumed the role of the state, and has 
not created an egalitarian environment where power is shared or developed outside of the 
department. 
There have been attempts to move beyond programmatic responses, as both senior 
researchers realized early on that Shannon needed to move past programs to incorporate a 
focus on structural barriers and systemic violence, however the other partners were not 
interested in entertaining the idea of broadening the interpretation of the CGM to 
incorporate a system’s level theory of change, which has kept individuals as the targets of 
intervention.  
Missing Voices in Planning and Decision-Making  
To move to a theory of change that is accountable to the voices of oppressed groups 
and the structural barriers they face would require the addition of CBPR principles into 
Shannon. This would start to put pressure on the status quo of problematizing individual 
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behavior.  CBPR principles operate without a preconceived conceptualization of the 
problem and desired intervention (Nation, et al., 2011). Without the inclusion of oppressed 
groups, the problem and strategy formulated by the professional class, will continue to rest 
on individual risk and responsibilization, with the individual becoming a scapegoat for 
structural inequalities.   
Over the life course of the Shannon partnership, communities, families and youth 
have been essentially left out of the decision-making or strategy formulation process. 
During the first few years of Shannon youth were interviewed about the employment 
program so it could be tailored to their needs, and they were solicited for feedback for the 
Clergy-Police mentoring program.  However, youth, community nor family were 
incorporated into any strategy formation or given a decision-making role. Goddard cites 
Skogan (1988), and Cherney and Sutton’s (2007) identification of “insurgent groups” and 
their belief that long-term crime reduction happens through challenging the existing 
economic and social arrangements (Goddard, 2014).  However, without those voices, we 
are bound to the other group Skogan terms ‘preservationists’, who advocate policies that 
continue the status quo (Goddard, 2014). Inclusion of “insurgent groups” could pressure 
larger systems, by acting as an agent of change not being deemed a voiceless target. CBPR 
principles, community coaction, and the inclusion of diverse voices could hold Shannon 
accountable to be responsive to the community need identified by the community.  
 Both senior researchers expressed that Shannon perpetuated the jockeying for 
money, however this is problematic given that these organizations could be more interested 
in obtaining the money for their programs than for advancing a shared community vision 
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within a partnership. “Organizations that seek to exploit the gang program simply to obtain 
funds to narrowly enhance existing program efforts that may be unrelated to the goals and 
objectives of the comprehensive, community-wide model may have to be bypassed or 
terminated form the project.  A special effort may need to be made to include grassroots 
groups” (Spergel, 2010, p. 239).  Shannon’s Program Coordinator expressed the need for 
the voices of grassroots groups as they are more connected to the community, however he 
experiences a barrier in bringing them into Shannon.  WCAC’s Director of Planning 
provided a potential answer as to why. Since Shannon is a reimbursement grant, grassroots 
groups may not be able to do any work without funding provided upfront.  This leaves 
bigger organizations at the table competing for funds, potentially removed from what is 
happening on the ground. The partnership relies on money to keep flowing from the state 
to the partnership and there is not a structure built into the grant to allow for the inclusion 
of grassroots groups, affirming how the partnership is an extension of governmentality and 
the maintenance of the status quo.  
SAM’s Director of Outreach voiced that he thought the input and participation of 
former gang members in Shannon would add a lot of value to the program and the youth’s 
experience being provided services through the program.  “A fairly common strategic 
organizational failure is the lack of interest or capacity of a program to employ former 
gang members or influential as team members” (Spergel, 2010, p. 241).  Part of 
community mobilization is the inclusion of former gang members (Spergel, 1995, p. 172). 
The implementation of the community mobilization strategy is very narrowly 
implemented and lacks integrity. At the same time, there is no accountability or 
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expectation that this component be integrated into the model, no clear direction about what 
community mobilization means, and no expectation that action research include 
community participation.  
Shannon’s Successes and Partner Recommendations 
Since 2010, there have been decreases in the number of aggravated assault and 
simple assault victims and offenders.  It is hard to say if this is correlated to Shannon and 
the other youth serving partnerships in the city, or if the trend is correlated to something 
else.  However, a youth and gang problem still exists and is perceived as big enough to 
dedicate a partnership to tackling.  
Even with the barriers and challenges facing Shannon, various perspectives of the 
successes of Shannon were shared during interviews.  A common theme emerged in which 
people expressed that the partnership was able to bring awareness to the issues of youth 
and gang violence.  However, the answers to what the community impact of the 
partnership has been were divided.  Some of the interviewees identified success as 
reaching as little as one youth who was impacted in a positive way by services.  WCAC’s 
Director of Planning said that when she used to collect all the info for the quarterly reports, 
she felt Shannon was absolutely working.  She and others remarked that Shannon was a 
slow incremental process, with subtle changes to address emerging needs. Other interviews 
said “nothing”, meaning nothing is changing as a result of the partnership. Another 
sentiment shared by the B&GC case worker is how the partnership is cutting down on 
competition, leading to a more friendly relationship between service providers and greater 
information sharing, collaboration and dialogue. Because power has been devolved to 
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more localized entities like partnerships, it is expected that agencies would be more likely 
to engage in active information sharing and collaboration to develop a robust network of 
services. It is important to note that through Shannon the barrier of a CORI check was 
removed to help kids get jobs through a referral system that may not have been possible 
otherwise.  
Several interviewees expressed different perspectives exist within the partnership, 
but that those views are able to come together for the mission of reducing youth and gang 
violence. Even though various organizational cultures exist, SAM’s Director of Outreach 
expressed that there is space for all voices. Suppression and intervention are working on 
different sides of the spectrum, but both WCAC’s Director of Planning and Director of 
Jobs and Education voiced that all the pieces are necessary, and that one organization 
cannot do it all.  It could be argued that the CGM and Shannon allow that model of 
dichotomous collaboration to exist, as neither outreach nor police efforts outside of 
Shannon include each other in their strategies. Shannon’s model could be understood the 
following way, “Modern youth justice appears as forever more hybrid; attempting to 
deliver complex and contradictory amalgam of the punitive, the responsibilising, the re-
moralizing, the inclusionary, the exclusionary and the protective” (Muncie, 2006).  
The recommendations made by interviewees were in response to the question of 
what allows a youth to desist from violence and achieve success? SAM’s Director of 
Outreach stated that there needed to be more funding for something radical, his idea is 
being able to take more trips outside of Worcester with kids in the program. The few times 
this has happened the kids go to a neighboring rural town and they ask if they are still in 
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Massachusetts.   Other interviewees echoed this by saying the best thing you could do is to 
get these kids out of Worcester. This reinforces the power that poverty, lack of tangible 
opportunity and territorial stigma have in dictating outcomes that exceed the individualized 
opportunities that Shannon provides.  However, his characterization of this 
recommendation as radical seems overstated; it is not radical enough to de-individualize 
interventions because it does not address ways to break down structural barriers and 
change the status quo that limit the successes of the youth targeted by Shannon.  
Discussion 
I concluded that there have been successes in increasing awareness of youth 
violence prevention and inter-agency communication.  However, Worcester’s Shannon 
partnership is an extension of governmentality tasked with conducting conduct, responsive 
to neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization, and espousing a narrow 
interpretation of the CGM that excludes the voices of oppressed groups.  Given this 
structure Shannon has not and will not move beyond programmatic responses to youth and 
gang violence. The status quo will be further maintained by the current function of the 
partnership. 
These findings also reveal that Shannon is not a partnership, but instead is a 
funding stream that connects service providers allowing programs to keep doing what they 
have been doing. The Worcester model of Shannon is not radical; it is not putting pressure 
or responsibility on systems or shifting the status quo, meaning it is in effect chasing 
problems instead of developing solutions to root causes.  If this is the case, the Shannon 
partnership is not the way to solve the problem, and it is overstating the power it has in 
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solving youth violence. It is taking up too much space in youth violence prevention, 
limiting the exploration of ideas other than individualized interventions.  
Researchers cannot tell policy makers or practitioners what the best course of 
action is, because the best course of action is beset by individual and organizational values 
and relies on assumptions about shared belief systems and shared objectives (Armstrong, 
2004).  Some of these belief systems and objectives are, in fact, using risk and 
responsibilization technologies to govern.  However, without an overall theory of change 
within the partnership, developed through CBPR principles, an honest account of what the 
partnership can accomplish, is reduced to a narrow interpretation of the CGM’s 
suppression, intervention and prevention modalities. 
It is important to mention that these findings could be interpreted in a different 
way. It could be argued that the purpose of Shannon is to provide opportunities for youth 
and the capacity of the partnership to do anything more lies beyond the purview of 
Shannon. These opportunities are provided in the form of programs, which are not 
unworthy of investment.  Services provided by outreach and case management reach a lot 
of youth and connect those youth to services they may have otherwise not been able to 
access.  However, without a parallel process that digs into addressing structural and 
systemic barriers the programmatic responses to violence will always fall short of 
achieving the overarching goal of reducing youth and gang violence because poverty and 
stigma will still exist.  
It could also be argued that the difference between doing good and doing bad are 
choices, and that everyone has the ability to make the right choice.  In effect, Shannon is 
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offering the opportunity for youth to make the “good” or “right” choice.  Services like 
street outreach and case management do provide youth with opportunities for “good” 
choices.  However, I argue that not all youth have access to “good” choices or access to 
sustain those choices because of the multiple disadvantages that are embedded in many 
youth’s lives.  
The limitations of this study are the missing voices within this analysis.  The 
knowledge the youth, whom Shannon directly impacts, have in providing 
recommendations and analyses of the capacity of the programs is invaluable to developing 
a comprehensive analysis of Shannon’s true capacity for community impact. This would be 
a direction for future research.  
 
Conclusion 
The problem of youth and gang violence does not deserve a reactionary approach to 
a solution (Goshe, 2014). Unless there is serious discussion about transforming structural 
barriers and ‘contending with the welfare of youth’ (Goshe, 2014), Shannon will never get 
ahead of the problem.  However, “the transformation of wider society to reduce the 
criminal effects of poverty and relative deprivation is certainly an even more challenging 
task” (O’Mahony, 2009).  This transformation ultimately does lie outside of Shannon to 
address. However, Shannon has the power to increase awareness of the structural factors 
that are producing the problem the partnership is trying to solve, by incorporating a theory 
of change that is not operating blindly to structural limitations.  Localized debates for 
transformational politics and further governmental innovation (Muncie, 2006) as well as 
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the integration of CBPR principles are needed before real change is produced and the 
limits of what Shannon can realistically accomplish are realized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Works Cited 
Alstrohm, W. & Havighurst, R. (1982). Kansas City Work/Study Experiment. In Daniel 
Shafer, School Programs for Disruptive Adolescents (eds). 259-275. 
Apel, R., Paternoster, R., Bushway, S. & Brame, R. (2006). A Job Isn’t Just a Job: The 
Differential Impact of Formal Work Versus Informal Work on Adolescent Problem 
Behavior. Crime and Delinquency, 52(2), 333-369.  
Arcidiacono, C., Procentese, F., Di Napoli, I. (2007). Youth, Community Belonging, 
Planning and Power. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 70, 280-
295. 
Armstrong, D. (2004). A Risky Business? Research, Policy, Governmentality and Youth 
Offending. Youth Justice , 4 (2), 100-116. 
Allen , S. (2015, July 3). Gun suspect part of gang war: Tension escalating between 
Worcester factions. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Backer, T., & Russ, A. (2007). Implementing Evidence Based Youth Violence Prevention 
Programs: One Community's Experiences. Human Interaction Research Institute. 
Baum, H. (2000). Fantasies and Realities in University-Community Partnerships. Journal 
of Planning Education and Research, 20, p. 234-246.  
Bidwell, D. (2009). Is Community-Based Participatory Research Postnormal Science? 
Science, Technology, & Human Values , 34 (6), 41-761. 
Bushway, S. & Reuter, P. (2002). Labor Markets and Crime Risk Factors. In Farringon & 
Welsh (Eds.), Preventing Crime. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. 
Caplan, K., & Jones, D. (2002). Partnership Indicators: Measuring the effectiveness of 
multi-sector approaches to service provision. Practitioner Note Series: Business 
Partners for Development, Water and Sanitation Cluster. London, UK.   
Carlton, E., Whiting, J., Bradford, K., Dyk, P., & Vail, A. (2009). Defining Factors of 
University-Community Collaborations: An Exploration of One Healthy Marriage 
Project. Family Relations, 58(1), p. 28-40.  
Census QuickFacts. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/.  
Cherney A and Sutton A (2007) Crime prevention in Australia: Beyond ‘what works?’ 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 40(1): 65–81. 
Clarke, J. (2005). New Labour’s citizens: activated, empowered,responsibilized, 
abandoned? Critical Social Policy , 25 (4), 447-463. 
Collura, J. (2010). Best Practices for Youth Employment Programs: A Synthesis of Current 
Research. What Works Wisconsin - Research to Practice Series,  Issue #9.  University 
of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2016). Availability of Grant Funds: 2016 Senator 
Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety Initiative. Executive Office of Public Safety 
and Security, Office of Grants and Research.  
Corr, M. (2014). Young People’s Early Offending: The Context of Strained Leisure 
Careers. Young , 22 (2), 113-133. 
Croteau, S. (2010, June 21). 2010 looking like a violent year in Worcester: Shootings are 
on upsurge; Police add more patrols. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Croteau, S. (2014, January 16). Stabbings, shootings, overall crime on rise. Worcester 
 56 
Telegram & Gazette, pp. B3. 
Croteau, S. & Whearley, J. (2007, August 5). Putting a lid on violence; Police chief says 
city is at the crossroads. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Crowley, J. (1984). Delinquency and Employment: Substitutions or Spurious Associations. 
In Borus, M. (Eds.), Youth and the Labor Market: Analyses of the National 
Longitudinal Survey (239-282). Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. 
Currie, E. (1985). Confronting Crime: An American Challenge. New York: Pantheon 
Books. In R. Chaskin (Eds.), Youth Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, 
Practice, and Evidence. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Curry, D. (2010). From Knowledge to Response and Back Again: Theory and Evaluation 
in Responding to Gangs.  
Dahlstedt, M. (2009). The Partnering Society: Governmentality, Partnerships, and Actice 
Local Citizenship. The Open Urban Studies Journal, 2, p. 18-27.  
Dechar, R. (2009). Gangs, Marginalised Youth and Social Capital. Stoke on Trent, United 
Kingdom: Trentham Books Limited. 
Decker, S., Pyrooz, D., Sweeten, G., Moule, R. (2014). Validating Self-Nomination in 
Gang Research: Assessing Differences in Gang-Embeddedness Across Non-Current 
and Former Gang Members. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 30(4), 577-598.  
Diego Vigil, J. (2010). Multiple Marginality and Human Development: Applying  
Research Insights for Gang Prevention and Intervention. In R. Chaskin (Eds.), Youth 
Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, Practice, and Evidence. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Farrington, D. (2000). Explaining and Preventing Crime: The Globalization of Knowledge 
- The American Society of Criminology 1999 Presidential Address. Criminology , 38 
(1), 1-24. 
Fleming, J. (2006). Working Through Networks: The Challenge of Partnership Policing. In 
J. Fleming & J. Dawn-Wood (Eds.), Working Through Networks: The Challenge of 
Partnership Policing (87-115). Syndey, Australia: UNSW Press.  
France, A. & Homel, R. (2007). Societal access routes and developmental pathways: 
putting social structure and young people's voices into the analysis of pathways into 
and out of crime. In A. France & R. Homel (Eds.), Pathways and Crime Prevention, 
Theory policy and practice. Portland, OR: Willan Publishing.  
Garbarino, J. (2014). Ecological Perspective on Child Well-Being. The Handbook of Child 
Well Being , 1365-1384. (F. C. Asher Ben-Arieh, Ed.) 
Garland, D. (1997). 'Governmentality' and the problem of crime: Foucault, criminology, 
sociology. Theoretical Criminology , 1 (2), 173-214. 
Garland, D. (1996). The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society. . The British Journal of Criminology , 36 (4), 445-471. 
Goddard, T. (2012). Post-welfarist risk managers? Risk, crime prevention and the 
responsibilization of community-based organizations. Theoretical Criminology , 0 (0), 
1-17. 
 57 
Goddard, T. (2014). The Indeterminacy of the Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm: A Case 
Study of Community Partnerships Implementing Youth and Gang Violence Prevention 
Policy. Youth Justice , 14 (1), 3-21. 
Goldson, B. (1997). 'Childhood': An Introduction to Historical and Theoretical Analyses. 
In P. Scranton (Eds.), "Childhood" in "crisis", (Chapter 1). Routledge.   
Goldson, B. (2000). 'Children in need' or 'young offenders'? Hardening ideology, 
organizational change and new challenges for social work with children in trouble. 
Child and Family Social Work , 5, 255-265. 
Goldson, B. (2002). New Punitiveness: The politics of child incarceration. In J. Muncie, G. 
Hughes & E. McLaughlin (Eds.), Youth Justice, Critical Readings (pp. 386-400). Sage 
Publications.   
Goldson, B. (2005). Taking liberties: policies and the punitive turn.  In H. Hendrick (Eds.), 
Child Welfare and Social Policy: An Essential Reader, (pp. 255-267). University of 
Chicago Press.  
Goshe, S. (2014). Moving Beyond the Punitive Legacy: Taking Stock of Persistent 
Problems in Juvenile Justice. Youth Justice , 15 (1), 42-56. 
Gray, P. (2009). The political economy of risk and the new governance of youth crime. 
Punishment & Society , 11 (4), 443-458. 
Green, L. D. (2001). Partnerships and Coalitions for Community Based-Research. Public 
Health Reports , 116 (1), 20-31. 
Grieco, J. V. (2014). Examining Research–Practice Partnerships in Policing Evaluations. 
Policing , 8 (4), 368-378. 
Haines, K. (2000). Referral Orders and Youth Offender Panels: Restorative Approaches 
and the New Youth Justice. In B. Goldson (Ed.), The New Youth Justice (pp. 58-80). 
Russell House Publishing . 
Hannah-Moffat, K. (2005). Criminogenic needs and the transformative risk subject . 
Punishment & Society , 7(1), 29-51. 
Jessop, B. (2002).  The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge, UK. Polity Press.  
Kaplan-Lyman, J. (2014). A Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New 
York City. Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, 15(1), 177-222.  
Katz, C. (2001). Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction. 
Antipode, 33 (4), 709-728. 
Katz, M. (2001). The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State. New 
York, New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Keene, D., Padilla, M. (2014). Spatial stigma and health inequality. Critical Public Health, 
24 (4), 392-404. 
Kemshall, H. (2008). Risks, Rights and Justice: Understanding and Responding to Youth 
Risk. National Association for Youth Justice , 8 (1), 21-37. 
Larner, W. & Butler, M. (2005). Governmentalities of Local Partnerships: The Rise of a 
"Partnering State" in New Zealand. Studies in Political Economy, 75, p. 75-101.  
Local Action Research Partner (LARP). (2009). Year Two Final Report. Ross, L., & 
Foley, E., Clark University.  
 58 
Laumann, E., & Pappi, F. (1976). Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on 
Community Influence Systems. New York: Academic Press.  
McAlister, S. C. (2014). Experiences of Youth Justice: Youth Justice Discourses and Their 
Multiple Effects. Youth Justice , 14 (3), 241-254. 
Mihalic, S.W. & Elliot, D. (1997). Short- and Long- Term Consequences of Adolescent 
Work. Youth and Society, 28(4), 464-498.  
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and 
Personal Life. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press. 
Mizen, P. (2006). Work and social order: The 'New Deal' for the young and unemployed. 
In B. Goldson & J. Muncie (Eds.), Youth crime and justice: critical issues, 187-200. 
London, England: Sage Publications.  
Monahan, J. (1992, June 23). City teens dislike the stereotype. Worcester Telegram & 
Gazette, pp. A3. 
Muncie, J. (2006). Governing Young People: coherence and contradiction in modern youth 
justice . Critical Social Policy , 26 (4), 770-793. 
Nation, M., Bess, K., Voight, A., Perkins, D. & Juarez, P. (2011). Levels of Community 
Engagement in Youth Violence Prevention: The Role of Power in Sustaining 
Successful University-Community Partnerships. American Journal of Community 
Psychology, 48, 89-96.  
National Gang Center. (2010). Best Practices to Address Community Gang Problems: 
OJJDP's Comprehensive Gang Model. U.S. Department of Justice.  
National Institute of Justice. Program Profile: Little Village Gang Violence Reduction 
Project (Comprehensive Gang Model). 
http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=278 
O'Mahony, P. (2009). The Risk Factors Prevention Paradigm and the Causes of Youth 
Crime: A Deceptively Useful Analysis? The National Association for Youth Justice , 9 
(2), 99-114. 
O'Malley, P. (2000). Criminologies of Catastrophe? Understanding Criminal Justice on the 
Edge of the New Millennium. The Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology , 33 (2), 153-167. 
Padilla, M. (2012). Spatial Stigma, Sexuality, and Neoliberal Decline in Detroit, Michigan. 
The Scholar and Feminist Online. 
Paternoster, R. Bushway, S., Brame, R. & Apel, R. (2003). The Effect of Teenage 
Employment on Delinquency and Problem Behaviors. Social Forces, 82(1), 297-335. 
Piliavin, I. & Masters, S. (1981). Impact of Employment Programs on Offenders, Addicts, 
and Problem Youth - Implications From Supported Work. Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
Ploeger, M. (1997). Youth Employment and Delinquency: Reconsidering a Problematic 
Relationship. Criminology, 35(4). 659-676.  
Phase 1 Case Study. (2006). Charles E. Shannon, Jr. Community Safety Initiative. City of 
Worcester.  
 59 
Riel, M. (2010-2016). Understanding Action Research. Center For Collaborative Action 
Research, Pepperdine University (Last revision Jan, 2016). Retrieved from: 
http://cadres.pepperdine.edu/ccar/define.html.  
Rodriguez, N. J. (2015). Race to Equity: The State of Black Massachusetts. The Urban 
League of Eastern Massachusetts . Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center. 
Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, N. (2000). Government and Control. British Journal of Criminology, 40, 321-339.  
Scraton, P. & Haydon, D. (2002). Challenging the criminalization of children and young 
people: securing a rights based agenda. In J. Muncie, G. Hughes & E. McLaughlin 
(Eds.), Youth Justice, Critical Readings. London: Sage Publications.   
Seidman, E. (1988). Back to the Future, Community Psychology: Unfolding a Theory of 
Social Intervention. American Journal of Community Psychology , 16 (1), 3-24. 
Skogan, W. (1988). Community organizations and crime. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), 
Crime and Justice: A Review of the Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
39-78.  
Slater, T. (2015). Territorial Stigmatization: Symbolic Defamation and the Contemporary 
Metropolis. In J. Hannigan & G. Richards (Eds.), The Handbook of New Urban 
Studies. London: Sage Publications.  
Springer, S. (2012). Neoliberalising violence: Of the exceptional and the exemplary in 
coalescing moments. Area , 44 (2), 136-143. 
Spergel, I. (1995). The Youth Gang Problem, A Community Approach.  New York, NY. 
Oxford University Press.  
Spergel, I. (2010). Community Gang Programs: Theory, Models, and Effectiveness. In R. 
Chaskin (Eds.), Youth Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, Practice, and 
Evidence. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Staff, J., Osgood, D.W., Schulenberg, J., Bachman, J. & Messersmith, E. (2010). 
Explaining the Relationship Between Employment and Juvenile Delinquency. 
Criminology, 48(4), 1101-1131. 
Staff, J. & Uggen, C. (2003). The Fruits of Good Work: Early Work Experiences and 
Adolescent Deviance. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40(3), 263-290. 
Stoecker, R. & Bonacich, E. (1992). Why Participatory Research? Guest Editors' 
Introduction. The American Sociologist, 23(4), 5-14.  
Sullivan, M. (1984). Youth Crime and Employment Patterns in Three Brooklyn 
Neighborhoods. Vera Institute of Justice. New York, NY. 
Sviridoff, M. & McElroy, J. (1985). Employment and Crime: A Summary Report.  Vera 
Institute of Justice. New York, NY. 
Thornberry, T., Lizotte, A., & Krohn, M. (2003). Causes and Consequence of 
Delinquency: Findings from the Rochester Youth Development Study. In T. 
Thornberry & M. Krohn (Eds.), Taking Stock of  Delinquency: An Overview of 
Findings from Contemporary Longitudinal Studies. New York, Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers.  
 60 
Tilton, J. (2010). Dangerous or Endangered?: Race and Politics of Youth in Urban 
America. New York: New York University Press.  
Uggen, C. & Wakefield, S. (2008). What Have We Learned from Longitudinal Studies of 
Work and Crime? In A. Liberman (Ed.), The Long View of Crime: A Synthesis of 
Longitudinal Research. Springer.  (pp. 191-219).  
Vidal, A. (1995). Reintegrating Disadvantaged Communities into the Fabric of Urban Life: 
The Role of Community Development. Housing Policy Debate, 6(1). 169-230. Fannie 
Mae.  
Van Ness, A., Fallon, R. & Lawrence, S. Resource Guide: A Systematic Approach to 
Improving Community Safety. Executive Office of Public Safety. February 27, 2006. 
Senator Charles E. Shannon, Jr. Community Safety Initiative 2006 Grant Program.  
Votey, H. (1991). Employment, Age, Race and Crime: A Labor Theoretic Investigation. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 7(2).  
Wald, M. & Martinez, T. (2003).  Connected by 25: Improving the Life Chances of the 
Country’s Most Vulnerable 14-24 Year Olds. William and Flora Hewlett Foundation 
Working Paper. Stanford University. 
Wacquant, L. (2010). Urban Desolation and Symbolic Denigration in the Hyperghetto. 
Social Psychology Quarterly , 73 (3), 215-219. 
Warr, D. (2015). The Ambivalent Implications of Strong Belonging for Young People 
Living in Poor Neighborhoods. In J. Wyn & H. Cahill (Eds.), Handbook of Children 
and Youth Studies , 665-677.  
Whearley, J. (1994, May 9).  Main South neighborhood takes a bite out of crime. 
Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Wiley, W.W. (1992a, February 2). Gangs or just groups? ; Police: Problem may be 
definition. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Wiley, W. W. (1992b, February 2). Groups offer alternatives to teens. Worcester Telegram 
& Gazette, pp. B1. 
Wiley, W.W. (1993, December 3). Rising crime plagues city; Local officials ponder ways 
to curb violence. Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Wiley, W.W. (1995, June 18). Fear of violence grows // Task force keeping pressure on. 
Worcester Telegram & Gazette, pp. A1. 
Wiley, W.W. (1995, June 21). Parents’ eyes are open to youths’ world. Worcester 
Telegram & Gazette, pp. A6. 
Worcester Quarterly Report (2015). Site Projections: Statement of Youth and Gang 
Violence.  
Wright, J.P., Cullen, F.T. & Williams, N. (1997). Working While in School and 
Delinquent Involvement: Implications for Social Policy. Crime & Delinquency, 43(2), 
203-221. 
Young, J. (2002). Crime and Social Exclusion. In R. Morgan, M. Maguire & R. Reiner 
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 3rd edition. Oxford University Press. (pp 
457-490).  
 
 
 61 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
